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Proste volitve za sovjetski kongres - zgodovina

Proste volitve za sovjetski kongres - zgodovina

Svobodne volitve so bile v Sovjetski zvezi prvič v njeni zgodovini. Oblikovanje novega sovjetskega kongresa poslancev je na izvoljene položaje v kongresu pripeljalo številne vodilne disidente, med njimi tudi Andreja Saharova. Izvoljen je bil tudi Boris Jelcin. Jelcin je bil leto prej izločen iz Centralnega komiteja.

Kljub temu, da so večino sedežev v kongresu imeli člani komunistične partije, so se seje kongresa, ki so potekale po volitvah, v živo prenašale po sovjetski televiziji in so bile proste in odprte. Posledične razprave so sovjetskim ljudem prvič prinesle potencialni pomen demokracije. Razprave so tudi javnosti prinesle številne skrivnosti, ki jih je imel komunistični režim.


Volitve na Kitajskem

Volitve v Ljudski republiki Kitajski temeljijo na hierarhičnem volilnem sistemu, po katerem se lokalni ljudski kongresi neposredno izvolijo. Vse višje ravni ljudskih kongresov do Državnega ljudskega kongresa (NPC), nacionalnega zakonodajnega organa, posredno izvoli Ljudski kongres na ravni, ki je neposredno spodaj. [1] Stalni odbor NPC lahko delno spremeni zakone, ki jih sprejme NPC, ko NPC ne zaseda, kar je pomembno, saj se Stalni odbor sestaja pogosteje kot NPC. [2]

Guvernerje, župane in vodje okrajev, okrožij, mest in mest izvolijo ustrezni lokalni ljudski kongresi. [3] Predsednike ljudskih sodišč in glavne prokuriste ljudskih prokuratorjev izvolijo ustrezni lokalni ljudski kongresi nad okrajno ravnijo. [3] Predsednika in državni svet izvoli Državni ljudski kongres, ki ga sestavlja 2980 ljudi.


Sovjetsko

Naši uredniki bodo pregledali, kar ste oddali, in ugotovili, ali želite popraviti članek.

Sovjetsko, svet, ki je bil primarna enota vlade v Zvezi sovjetskih socialističnih republik in ki je uradno opravljal zakonodajne in izvršilne funkcije na vseslovenski, republiški, pokrajinski, mestni, okrožni in vaški ravni.

Sovjetski svet se je prvič pojavil med neredom v Sankt Peterburgu leta 1905, ko so predstavniki stavkajočih delavcev, ki so delovali pod socialističnim vodstvom, ustanovili Sovjeto delavskih poslancev za usklajevanje revolucionarnih dejavnosti. Vlada ga je zatrla. Malo pred abdikacijo carja Nikolaja II. Marca 1917 in ustanovitvijo začasne vlade so socialistični voditelji ustanovili Petrogradski sovjet delavskih in vojaških poslancev, sestavljen iz enega namestnika na vsakih 1000 delavcev in enega za vsako vojaško podjetje. Večina od 2500 poslancev je bila pripadnikov socialdemokratske stranke, ki so trdili, da zastopajo kmečke interese. Ta sovjetski Petrograd je stal kot "druga vlada" nasproti začasni vladi in je pogosto izpodbijal njeno avtoriteto. Sovjeti so nastali v mestih po Ruskem cesarstvu. Velik del njihove avtoritete in legitimnosti v očeh javnosti je prihajal iz vloge Sovjetov kot natančnih odsevnikov ljudske volje: delegati niso imeli določenih mandatov, pogoste nadomestne volitve pa so imele dovolj možnosti za hiter vpliv volivcev.

Junija 1917 se je v Petrogradu (danes Sankt Peterburg) sklical prvi vseruski kongres sovjetov, sestavljen iz delegacij lokalnih sovjetov. Izvolil je osrednji izvršni odbor, ki bo na stalni seji, s predsedstvom tega odbora na čelu kongresa. Drugi kongres se je sestal takoj zatem, ko je radikalna boljševiška frakcija Petrogradskega sovjeta, ki je v tem telesu pridobila večino, načrtovala strmoglavljenje začasne vlade s strani Rdeče garde in nekaterih podpornih čet. V znak protesta proti državnemu udaru (ruska revolucija oktobra 1917) je večina neboljševiških članov kongresa odšla, tako da so boljševiki prevzeli nadzor nad vseboljševiškim Svetom ljudskih komisarjev, ki je bil ustanovljen kot nova ruska vlada. Sovjeti po vsem cesarstvu so prevzeli lokalno oblast, čeprav je trajalo nekaj časa, da so boljševiki dosegli prevladujoč položaj v vsaki Sovjeti.

Na petem vseslovenskem kongresu sovjetov leta 1918 je bila sestavljena ustava, ki je Sovjetsko zvezo ustanovila kot formalno enoto lokalne in regionalne oblasti ter vseslovenski kongres sovjetov potrdila kot najvišji državni organ. Kasneje je ustava iz leta 1936 predvidevala neposredne volitve dvočasnega vrhovnega sovjeta-sovjeta zveze, v katerem je članstvo temeljilo na prebivalstvu, in sovjeta narodnosti, v katerem so bili člani izvoljeni na regionalni osnovi. Nominalno so poslanci in predsedniki sovjetov na vseh ravneh izvolili državljani, vendar je bil na teh volitvah samo en kandidat za katero koli funkcijo, izbiro kandidatov pa je nadzorovala komunistična partija.


Predsedniške volitve leta 1800: Vodnik po virih

Digitalne zbirke Kongresne knjižnice vsebujejo najrazličnejše gradivo, povezano s predsedniškimi volitvami leta 1800, vključno z rokopisi, spiski in vladnimi dokumenti. Ta priročnik združuje povezave do digitalnega gradiva v zvezi s predsedniškimi volitvami leta 1800, ki je na voljo na celotni spletni strani Kongresne knjižnice. Poleg tega ponuja povezave do zunanjih spletnih mest, osredotočenih na volitve leta 1800, in izbrano bibliografijo

1800 Rezultati predsedniških volitev

& quotDemokratsko-republikanec Thomas Jefferson je na predsedniških volitvah leta 1800 premagal federalista Johna Adamsa s prednostjo sedemindvajset do petinpetdeset volilnih glasov. Ko so glasovali predsedniški volivci, pa niso uspeli razlikovati med funkcijo predsednika in podpredsednika na svojih glasovnicah. Jefferson in njegov tekaški kolega Aaron Burr sta prejela vsak po triinšestdeset glasov. Z izenačenimi glasovi so bile volitve predložene predstavniškemu domu, kot zahteva člen II, oddelek 1 ustave ZDA. Tam je vsaka država glasovala kot enota za odločanje o volitvah.

Še vedno prevladujoči federalisti, je sejoči kongres odvračal glasovati za Jeffersona in njihovega partizanskega sovražnika. Jefferson in Burr sta šest dni, začenši 11. februarja 1801, v bistvu tekla drug proti drugemu v Parlamentu. Glasovi so bili zbrani več kot tridesetkrat, vendar nobeden ni osvojil potrebne večine devetih držav. Sčasoma je federalist James A. Bayard iz Delawareja pod močnim pritiskom in v strahu za prihodnost Unije sporočil svojo namero, da izstopi iz slepe ulice. Kot osamljeni predstavnik Delaware & rsquos je Bayard nadzoroval celotno glasovanje države & rsquos. Na šestintridesetem glasovanju so Bayard in drugi federalisti iz Južne Karoline, Marylanda in Vermonta oddali prazne glasovnice, s čimer so prekinili slepo ulico in dali Jeffersonu podporo desetih držav, dovolj za zmago na predsedniškem položaju. & Quot (Vir: Danes v zgodovini, februar 17)

    , Letopis kongresa, Predstavniški dom, 11. februar do 18. februar 1801., Letopis kongresa, Predstavniški dom, 17. februar 1801
  • Resolucija, s katero je bil Aaron Burr obveščen o njegovi izvolitvi za podpredsednika, Annals of Congress, Senat, 18. februar 1801., Congressional Globe, 31. januar 1855, ki je opravičil pokojnega Jamesa A. Bayarda iz Delawareja in ovrgel neutemeljene obtožbe, vsebovane v & quotAnas & quot; Thomas Jefferson, ki omajava njegov lik (1855).
    , & "Ugotavljam, da glasovanje v Kentuckyju vzpostavlja povezavo med liki Repub: in posledično vrže rezultat v roke H. of R. &" [Prepis], & "Rezultat tekmovanja v H. of R. je bil na splošno iskali v tem četrtletju. & quot [Prepis]

Celotni prispevki Thomasa Jeffersona iz oddelka za rokopise v Kongresni knjižnici so sestavljeni iz približno 27.000 dokumentov.

    , "Razumem, da je nekaj visoko letečih federalistov izrazilo upanje, da sta lahko republiški vozovnici enaki, in v tem primeru odločita, da preprečita izbiro H R." & Transkript, & quot; Slednje pa mislim, da ni mogoče , prvi pa ni verjeten in da bo med obema republikanskima kandidatkoma obstajala absolutna pariteta. & quot [Transkripcija], & ldquoSedaj so prispeli vsi glasovi, razen Vermonta in Kentuckeyja, in ni dvoma, da je rezultat popoln enakovrednost med obema republikanskima likoma. & quot [Prepis] & & ldquo Sklep ustave o označevanju glasov slabo deluje, ker ne izraža natančno pravega izraza javne volje. & quot [Prepis] & quot sovražnik si bo prizadeval posejati plevel med nas, da bi lahko razdelil nas in naše prijatelje. Vsak premislek me zadovoljuje, da boste tega pazili, saj vam zagotavljam, da sem odločno. & Quot; [Transkripcija] & quot; Ne upam si, da bi vam po kanalu objave prišlo na besedo o temi volitev. Dejansko je prestrezanje in objava mojih pisem izpostavilo republikansko zadevo in tudi mene osebno tako zabloki, da sem prišel do sklepa, da v pismu nikoli ne napišem drugega stavka politike. & Rdquo [Prepis], & quot; To je jutro izvolitev H R. & quot [Prepis], & quot; To je četrti dan glasovanja in nič ni storjeno. & quot [Prepis], & quotMr. Jefferson je naš predsednik. & Quot; , & amp 2. prazne glasove. & quot [Prepis]

Chronicling America: Zgodovinski ameriški časopisi

  • & quotO svobodnjakom Marylanda & quot The National Intelligencer in Washington Advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 7. novembra 1800.
  • & quotO volitvah predsednika & quot The National Intelligencer in Washington Advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 24. decembra 1800.
  • & quot; Izvolitev predsednika & quot The National Intelligencer in Washington Advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 13. februarja 1801.
  • The National Intelligencer in Washington Advertiser. (Washington City [D.C.]), 18. februar 1801.

17. februar 1801

17. februarja 1801 je predsedniški kandidat Thomas Jefferson dobil podporo večine predstavnikov kongresa, ki so zamenjali dosedanjega Johna Adamsa. Jeffersonovo zmagoslavje je končalo eno najhujših predsedniških kampanj v zgodovini ZDA in razrešilo resno ustavno krizo.

Projekt ameriškega predsedstva: volitve 1800

Spletna stran projekta ameriškega predsedstva predstavlja rezultate volitev na predsedniških volitvah leta 1800.

Predstavlja izvirno kopijo glasovanja volivcev za predsedniške volitve leta 1800, 11. februarja 1801, iz evidenc senata Združenih držav.

Zbirka volilnih izidov, ki jih je mogoče iskati, od leta 1787 do 1825. Podatke je zbral Philip Lampi. Digitalno zbirko in arhiv Univerze Tufts in Ameriško antikvarniško društvo sta jo postavila na spletu s sredstvi Nacionalne fundacije za humanistične vede.

Enciklopedija Thomas Jefferson na spletnem mestu Monticello ponuja pregled predsedniških volitev leta 1800.

Primarni viri

Bayard, Richard H., komp. Dokumenti v zvezi s predsedniškimi volitvami leta 1801. Philadelphia: Mifflin in Parry, 1831.
Klicna številka LC: AC901 .M5 vol. 18, ne. 18 [Zapis v katalogu] [Celotno besedilo]

Hamilton, Aleksander. Pismo Alexandra Hamiltona o javnem ravnanju in značaju Johna Adamsa, esq., Predsednika Združenih držav. New York: Za John Lang natisnil George F. Hopkins, 1800. [Zapis iz kataloga] [Celotno besedilo]

Sekundarni viri

Dunn, Susan. Druga revolucija Jefferson & rsquos: Volilna kriza leta 1800 in zmagoslavje republikanizma. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004.
Klicna številka LC: E330 .D86 2004 [Kataloški zapis]

Ferling, John E. Adams proti Jeffersonu: burne volitve leta 1800. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Klicna številka LC: E330 .F47 2004 [Kataloški zapis]

Horn, James, Jan Ellen Lewis in Peter S. Onuf, ur. Revolucija leta 1800: demokracija, rasa in nova republika. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002.
LC klicna številka: E330 .R48 2002 [Kataloški zapis]

Larson, Edward J. Veličastna katastrofa: burne volitve leta 1800, prva predsedniška kampanja v Ameriki & rsquos. New York: Free Press, 2007.
Klicna številka LC: E330 .L37 2007 [Kataloški zapis]

Sharp, James Roger. Slepe volitve leta 1800: Jefferson, Burr in Union v ravnotežju. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010.
Klicna številka LC: E330 .S53 2010 [Kataloški zapis]

Weisberger, Bernard A. America Afire: Jefferson, Adams in revolucionarne volitve leta 1800. New York: William Morrow, 2000.
Klicna številka LC: E330 .W45 2000 [Kataloški zapis]

Beyer, Mark. Volitve leta 1800: Kongres pomaga pri tristranskem glasovanju. New York: Rosen Pub. Skupina, 2004.
LC klicna številka: E330 .B49 2004 [Kataloški zapis]

Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., ur. Volitve leta 1800 in uprava Thomasa Jeffersona. Philadelphia: Mason Crest Publishers, 2003.
Klicna številka LC: JK524 .E355 2003 [Kataloški zapis]


Zgodovina

SPD izvira iz združitve leta 1875 Splošnega nemškega delavskega sindikata, ki ga vodi Ferdinand Lassalle, in Socialdemokratske delavske stranke, ki jo vodita August Bebel in Wilhelm Liebknecht. Leta 1890 je sprejela sedanji naziv Socialdemokratska stranka Nemčije. Za zgodnjo zgodovino stranke so bili značilni pogosti in intenzivni notranji konflikti med tako imenovanimi revizionisti in ortodoksnimi marksisti ter preganjanje nemške vlade in njenega kanclerja Otta von Bismarcka. Revizionisti, ki sta jih ob različnih časih vodila Lassalle in Eduard Bernstein, so trdili, da je socialno in ekonomsko pravičnost za delavski razred mogoče doseči z demokratičnimi volitvami in institucijami ter brez nasilnega razrednega boja in revolucije. Pravoslavni marksisti so vztrajali, da svobodne volitve in državljanske pravice ne bodo ustvarile resnično socialistične družbe in da vladajoči razred nikoli ne bo odstopil oblasti brez boja. Dejansko so nemške elite poznega 19. stoletja že obstoj socialistične stranke štele za grožnjo varnosti in stabilnosti na novo združenega Reicha, od leta 1878 do 1890 pa je bila stranka uradno prepovedana.

Kljub zakonom, ki stranki prepovedujejo sestanke in distribucijo literature, je SPD pridobila vse večjo podporo in je lahko še naprej tekmovala na volitvah, do leta 1912 pa je bila največja stranka v Reichstagu ("cesarska dieta"), ki je prejela več kot tretjino državnega glasovanja. Vendar pa je glasovanje za vojne zasluge leta 1914 in katastrofalna usoda Nemčije v prvi svetovni vojni privedlo do notranjega razkola, pri katerem so centristi pod vodstvom Karla Kautskega ustanovili Neodvisno socialdemokratsko stranko, levica pod Roso Luxemburg in Liebknecht pa Ligo Spartacus, ki je decembra 1918 postala Komunistična partija Nemčije (KPD).

Desno krilo SPD pod vodstvom Friedricha Eberta se je združilo z liberalci in konservativci, da bi zatrlo vstaje v sovjetskem slogu v Nemčiji v letih 1918–20. Po prvi svetovni vojni je imela SPD osrednjo vlogo pri nastanku Weimarske republike ter v njeni kratki in tragični zgodovini. Na splošnih volitvah leta 1919 je SPD prejela 37,9 odstotka glasov (neodvisni socialdemokrati pa še 7,6 odstotka), vendar stranka ni uspela pridobiti ugodnih pogojev od zaveznikov na mirovni konferenci v Parizu leta 1919 (izrazi, določeni v Pogodbi Versailles) in hudi gospodarski problemi države so povzročili upad podpore. Kljub temu je bila skupaj z rimskokatoliško in liberalno stranko del več koalicijskih vlad, vendar je bila prisiljena vložiti veliko truda v svojo konkurenco s KPD za podporo delavskega razreda. Leta 1924 je SPD, ki se je do takrat ponovno združila z neodvisnimi, osvojila le petino glasov. Čeprav je bila njegova osrednja podpora med delavci modrih ovratnikov razmeroma stabilna, je SPD izgubila podporo med belimi ovratniki in malimi podjetniki, od katerih so mnogi svojo zvestobo preusmerili v konzervativce in kasneje v nacistično stranko. Do leta 1933 je imela SPD le 120 od 647 sedežev v Reichstagu do nacistov 288 in komunistov 81.

SPD je bila prepovedana kmalu po prihodu nacistov na oblast leta 1933. Vendar pa je bila leta 1945, s padcem Tretjega rajha Adolfa Hitlerja, SPD oživljena. To je bila edina preživela stranka iz obdobja Weimarja z neoporečnim zapisom nasprotovanja Hitlerju, za razliko od drugih weimarskih strank, SPD je v času tretjega rajha ohranila organizacije izgnanstva v Veliki Britaniji in ZDA. Poleg tega je v Nemčiji delovala podzemna organizacija, ki je uspela preživeti dokaj nedotaknjena. Ko so se po vojni v okupirani Nemčiji ponovno začele demokratične volitve, je imela SPD veliko prednost pred tekmeci, pričakovano pa je, da bo postala vladajoča stranka v državi.

SPD se je v večini res dobro odrezal Dežela- (državno) volitve na ravni med letoma 1946 in 1948. Vendar so na prvih državnozborskih volitvah v Zahodni Nemčiji, ki so potekale leta 1949, SPD tesno premagali novonastali krščanski demokrati, ki so lahko sestavili večinsko koalicijo z več manjšimi desnosredinske stranke. Po izgubi leta 1949 so v letih 1953 in 1957 sledili odločilni porazi.

Po volitvah leta 1957 je skupina reformatorjev v veliki meri prišla z območij, kjer je bila stranka najmočnejša (npr. Zahodni Berlin, Severno Porenje -Vestfalija in Hamburg) sprožila ponovno oceno vodstva, organizacije in politike stranke. Ugotovili so, da je SPD slabo razumela povojno javno mnenje. Verjeli so, da se je večina Nemcev naveličala ideološke retorike o razrednem boju, gospodarskem načrtovanju in vladnih prevzemih industrije - politiki, ki je bila takrat osrednja v partijskem programu. Volivci so bili zadovoljni tudi s članstvom Zahodne Nemčije v Organizaciji Severnoatlantske pogodbe (NATO) in Evropski gospodarski skupnosti in niso imeli veliko zanimanja za poudarjanje SPD na ponovni združitvi države z nevtralistično zunanjo politiko. Tako je SPD na posebni strankarski konferenci v Bad Godesbergu leta 1959 uradno zavrnila skoraj stoletje zavezanosti socializmu, tako da je sprejela tržno gospodarstvo, stranka pa je tudi podprla zvezo Nato in opustila svoj tradicionalni antiklerikalni odnos.

Program Bad Godesberg se je izkazal za uspešnega. Od leta 1961 do 1972 je SPD povečala svoj nacionalni glas s 36 na skoraj 46 odstotkov. Leta 1966 je vstopila v veliko koalicijo s svojim glavnim tekmecem, zavezništvom Krščansko demokratska unija-Krščansko socialna unija (CDU-CSU), od leta 1969 do 1982 pa je SPD vladala kot prevladujoči koalicijski partner s Svobodno demokratsko stranko (FDP). V času delovanja stranke v tem obdobju sta oba kanclerja SPD Willy Brandt in Helmut Schmidt sprožila velike spremembe v zunanji in notranji politiki, na primer Brandt je vodil zunanjo politiko miru in sprave z vzhodno Evropo in Sovjetsko zvezo ter Schmidt uspešno vodil Nemčijo skozi burno gospodarsko krizo sedemdesetih let. Do leta 1982 pa je 16 let vladanja dalo svoj davek. Stranka je bila tako glede okoljske kot vojaške politike globoko razdeljena, voditelji stranke pa so izgubili podporo v večini ljudi. Na primer, Schmidtovo podporo novi generaciji Natovih jedrskih raket, ki bodo nameščene v Nemčiji, je nasprotovala velika večina strankinih aktivistov. Leta 1982 je koalicijski partner stranke, FDP, odstavil SPD s položaja in pomagal izvoliti kanclerja CDM -ja Helmuta Kohla.

SPD je od leta 1982 do 1998 ostal brez oblasti na nacionalni ravni in utrpel štiri zaporedne izgube na volitvah. Leta 1998 je SPD, ki ga vodi centristična agenda, pod vodstvom Gerharda Schröderja, uspel sestaviti vladno koalicijo s stranko zelenih. Schröder se je zavzel za platformo nižjih davkov in znižanja državne porabe za spodbujanje naložb in ustvarjanje delovnih mest. Kljub nesposobnosti Schröderjeve vlade, da oživi gospodarstvo in zmanjša brezposelnost, je bil SPD leta 2002 ožje izvoljen, zmaga pa je bila v veliki meri zaslužna za priljubljenost Schröderjevega odziva na zgodovinske poplave v državi in ​​njegovo zavezo, da ne bo podprl ali sodeloval v ameriški vojski akcijo proti Iraku.

Med drugim mandatom vlade SPD ni mogla zmanjšati brezposelnosti ali oživiti stagnirajočega gospodarstva v državi, zato je na državnih volitvah utrpela vrsto uničujočih izgub. Na tisoče članov stranke je zapustilo SPD v znak protesta zaradi zmanjšanja števila svetih programov, kot so nadomestila za brezposelnost in zdravstveno varstvo, nekateri bivši člani stranke SPD pa so pod vodstvom nekdanjega vodje SDD Oskarja Lafontainea, ki ga je nova stranka leta 2005 skupaj vodila, ustanovili alternativno stranko. Stranka demokratičnega socializma na vzhodu (PDS). Kljub razcepu in nezadovoljstvu z vlado SPD je Schröder še vedno ohranil široko priljubljenost, SPD pa je zavzela 34 odstotkov nacionalnih glasov. Od CDU-CSU so padli le štirje sedeži, vendar nobeni ni uspel sestaviti večinske vlade s svojim najljubšim koalicijskim partnerjem zaradi uspeha nove stranke Lafontaine in PDS. Po pogajanjih je SPD sklenila veliko koalicijo s CDU-CSU kot mlajšim partnerjem, Schröder pa je odstopil s kanclerstva.

Na nemških parlamentarnih volitvah leta 2009 je SPD doživela uničujoč upad podpore. Stranka je osvojila le 23 odstotkov nacionalnih glasov, število poslancev v Bundestagu pa se je zmanjšalo z 222 na 146, kar je precej pod 239 sedeži CDU-CSU. SPD je bila tako izgnana iz nemške koalicijske vlade in v pozicijo opozicije. Njegov položaj se je zaradi parlamentarnih volitev leta 2013 izboljšal. Čeprav je bila s 26 odstotki glasov na drugem mestu, se je SPD pridružila vladi zmagovalne zveze CDU-CSU v "veliki koaliciji". Prejšnji koalicijski partner CDU-CSU, FDP, ni uspel doseči praga, potrebnega za zastopanje v Bundestagu.

Udeležba v veliki koaliciji ni pripomogla k priljubljenosti SPD, manjše stranke pa so opazile, da se je njihova podpora povečevala ob stalni, čeprav nepredvidljivi, gospodarski rasti in naraščajočem občutku proti priseljencem. Na splošnih volitvah septembra 2017 je SPD osvojila le 20 odstotkov glasov, kar je najslabši rezultat v povojnem obdobju. Čeprav se je vodja stranke Martin Schulz zaobljubil, da SPD ne bo sodelovala v drugi veliki koaliciji, so meseci neuspešnih pogovorov in možnosti novih volitev pripeljali do tega, da je Schulz obrnil svojo zavezo. Marca 2018 so člani stranke odobrili nadaljevanje velike koalicije s CDU-CSU Angele Merkel.


Konec apartheida

Apartheid, afriško ime, ki ga je južnoafriška nacionalistična stranka, ki je bila pod vlado belih držav leta 1948, ostremu, institucionaliziranemu sistemu rasne segregacije, se je končalo v začetku devetdesetih let v vrsti korakov, ki so privedli do oblikovanja demokratično vlado leta 1994. Leta nasilnih notranjih protestov, oslabljena zavezanost belcev, mednarodne gospodarske in kulturne sankcije, gospodarski boji in konec hladne vojne so v Pretoriji podrli oblast belih manjšin. Ameriška politika do režima je doživela postopno, a popolno preobrazbo, ki je imela pomembno nasprotujočo si vlogo pri prvem preživetju Apartheida in morebitnem padcu.

Čeprav so mnoge segregacijske politike segale v zgodnja desetletja dvajsetega stoletja, so volitve nacionalistične stranke leta 1948 zaznamovale začetek najhujših značilnosti legaliziranega rasizma, imenovanega apartheid. Hladna vojna je bila takrat v zgodnjih fazah. Glavni zunanjepolitični cilj ameriškega predsednika Harryja Trumana je bil omejiti širitev Sovjetske zveze. Kljub temu, da je podprla domači program državljanskih pravic za uveljavljanje pravic temnopoltih v ZDA, se je Trumanova uprava odločila, da ne bo protestirala proti sistemu apartheida protikomunistične južnoafriške vlade, da bi ohranila zaveznika proti Sovjetski zvezi v južni Afriki. . To je postavilo temelje, da bodo naslednje uprave tiho podpirale režim apartheida kot trdnega zaveznika proti širjenju komunizma.

Znotraj Južne Afrike so nemiri, bojkoti in protesti temnopoltih Južnoafričanov proti beli oblasti nastopili od nastanka neodvisne bele oblasti leta 1910. Nasprotovanje se je okrepilo, ko je nacionalistična stranka, ki je leta 1948 prevzela oblast, učinkovito blokirala vsa zakonita in nenasilna sredstva političnega protesta nebelcev. Afriški nacionalni kongres (ANC) in njegov podmladek, Panafriški kongres (PAC), ki sta predvidela zelo drugačno obliko vladavine, ki temelji na večinski vladavini, sta bila leta 1960 prepovedana, mnogi njeni voditelji pa zaprti. Najbolj znan zapornik je bil vodja ANC, Nelson Mandela, ki je postal simbol boja proti apartheidu. Medtem ko so Mandela in številni politični zaporniki ostali v zaporu v Južni Afriki, so drugi voditelji proti apartheidu pobegnili iz Južne Afrike in ustanovili sedež v zaporedju podpornih, neodvisnih afriških držav, vključno z Gvinejo, Tanzanijo, Zambijo in sosednjim Mozambikom, kjer so nadaljevali boj proti konec apartheida. Šele v osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja so te nemire dejansko stale južnoafriško državo znatne izgube v prihodkih, varnosti in mednarodnem ugledu.

Mednarodna skupnost je začela opažati brutalnost režima apartheida, potem ko je bela južnoafriška policija v mestu Sharpeville leta 1960 odprla ogenj po neoboroženih črnih protestnikih, pri čemer je ubila 69 ljudi in ranila 186 drugih. Združeni narodi so vodili poziv k sankcijam proti južnoafriški vladi. Zaradi strahu pred izgubo prijateljev v Afriki, ko je dekolonizacija spremenila celino, so močni člani Varnostnega sveta, vključno z Veliko Britanijo, Francijo in Združenimi državami, uspeli razveljaviti predloge. Vendar so do poznih sedemdesetih let množična gibanja v Evropi in Združenih državah uspela pritisniti na svoje vlade, da uvedejo gospodarske in kulturne sankcije za Pretorijo. Potem ko je ameriški kongres leta 1986 sprejel celovit zakon proti apartheidu, so se številna večnacionalna podjetja umaknila iz Južne Afrike. Do konca osemdesetih let se je južnoafriško gospodarstvo borilo z učinki notranjega in zunanjega bojkota ter bremenom svoje vojaške zaveze pri okupaciji Namibije.

Zagovorniki režima apartheida, tako v Južni Afriki kot zunaj nje, so jo promovirali kot branik proti komunizmu. Konec hladne vojne pa je ta argument zastaral. Južna Afrika je ob koncu druge svetovne vojne nezakonito okupirala sosednjo Namibijo, od sredine sedemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja pa jo je Pretoria uporabljala kot oporišče za boj proti komunistični stranki v Angoli. Združene države so celo podprle prizadevanja južnoafriških obrambnih sil v Angoli. V osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja so trdovratni antikomunisti v Washingtonu kljub gospodarskim sankcijam, ki jih je uvedel ameriški kongres, še naprej spodbujali odnose z vlado apartheida. Sprostitev napetosti hladne vojne pa je privedla do pogajanj za rešitev spora hladne vojne v Angoli. Gospodarski boji Pretorije so voditelje apartheida močno spodbudili k sodelovanju. Ko je Južna Afrika leta 1988 dosegla večstranski sporazum o prekinitvi okupacije Namibije v zameno za kubanski umik iz Angole, so tudi najbolj goreči protikomunisti v Združenih državah izgubili utemeljitev za podporo režima apartheida.

Učinki notranjih nemirov in mednarodne obsodbe so privedli do dramatičnih sprememb, ki so se začele leta 1989. Južnoafriški premier P. W. Botha je odstopil, potem ko je postalo jasno, da je izgubil vero vladajoče Nacionalne stranke (NP) zaradi tega, ker v državi ni uvedel reda. Njegov naslednik, F W de Klerk, je s potezo, ki je presenetila opazovalce, v svojem uvodnem nagovoru Parlamentu februarja 1990 napovedal, da odpravlja prepoved ANC in drugih temnoosvobodilnih strank, dovoljuje svobodo tiska in izpusti politične zapornike. Država je v pričakovanju čakala na izpustitev Nelsona Mandele, ki je 11. februarja 1990 po 27 letih zapustil zapor.

Učinek izpusta Mandele je odmeval po vsej Južni Afriki in po svetu. Po pogovoru z množico privržencev v Cape Townu, kjer se je zavezal, da bo nadaljeval boj, a se je zavzel za mirne spremembe, je Mandela svoje sporočilo posredoval mednarodnim medijem. Odpravil se je na svetovno turnejo, vrhunec pa je bil obisk ZDA, kjer je govoril pred skupnim zasedanjem kongresa.


Ustavni okvir

Struktura nove ruske vlade se je bistveno razlikovala od strukture nekdanje sovjetske republike. Zanj je bil značilen boj za moč med izvršilno in zakonodajno vejo, predvsem glede vprašanj ustavne oblasti ter hitrosti in smeri demokratičnih in gospodarskih reform. Konflikti so prišli do izraza septembra 1993, ko je predsednik Jelcin razpustil ruski parlament (kongres ljudskih poslancev in vrhovni sovet), so se nekateri poslanci in njihovi zavezniki uprli in so jih zatrli le z vojaškim posredovanjem.

12. decembra 1993 je tri petine ruskih volivcev ratificiralo novo ustavo, ki jo je predlagal Jelcin, predstavniki pa so bili izvoljeni v nov zakonodajni organ. Po novi ustavi ima predsednik, ki je izvoljen z nacionalnim glasovanjem in ne more več kot dvakrat zaporedoma opravljati več mandatov, velika pooblastila. Kot vodja ruske države je predsednik pooblaščen, da imenuje predsednika vlade (predsednika vlade), ključne sodnike in člane kabineta. Predsednik je tudi vrhovni poveljnik oboroženih sil in lahko razglasi vojno stanje ali izredne razmere. Kadar zakonodajalec ne sprejme predsednikovih zakonodajnih pobud, lahko izda odloke, ki imajo veljavo zakona. Leta 2008 je sprememba ustave, ki je začela veljati z volitvami 2012, podaljšala predsedniški mandat s štirih na šest let.

Po novi ustavi je zvezna skupščina postala zakonodajalec države. Sestavljajo ga Svet federacije (zgornji dom, ki ga sestavljajo imenovani predstavniki vsakega od ruskih upravnih oddelkov) in Državna duma (450-članski ljudsko izvoljeni spodnji dom). Predsednikovo imenovanje za predsednika vlade odobri Državna duma, če trikrat zavrne kandidata ali dvakrat izglasuje nezaupnico v treh mesecih, lahko predsednik razpusti Državno dumo in razpiše nove volitve. Vsa zakonodaja mora najprej sprejeti Državno dumo, preden jo obravnava Svet federacije. Predsedniški veto na predlog zakona lahko zakonodajalec razveljavi z dvotretjinsko večino ali pa predlog zakona spremeni tako, da vključuje predsedniške pridržke in ga sprejme z večino glasov. With a two-thirds majority (and approval by the Russian Constitutional Court), the legislature may remove the president from office for treason or other serious criminal offenses. The Federation Council must approve all presidential appointments to the country’s highest judicial bodies (Supreme Court and Constitutional Court).

The constitution provides for welfare protection, access to social security, pensions, free health care, and affordable housing it also guarantees local self-governance. Nevertheless, national law takes precedence over regional and local laws, and the constitution enumerates many areas that either are administered jointly by the regions and the central government or are the exclusive preserve of the central government. In the years after the constitution’s enactment, the central government implemented several measures to reduce the power and influence of regional governments and governors. In 2000 Pres. Vladimir Putin created seven federal districts above the regional level to increase the central government’s power over the regions (glej discussion below). His successor, Dmitry Medvedev, continued this policy: as a part of Moscow’s ongoing efforts to quell separatism and Islamic militancy in the Caucasus, he created an eighth federal district there in 2010.


Thomas Jefferson, Aaron Burr and the Election of 1800

On the afternoon of September 23, 1800, Vice President Thomas Jefferson, from his Monticello home, wrote a letter to Benjamin Rush, the noted Philadelphia physician. One matter dominated Jefferson’s thoughts: that year’s presidential contest. Indeed, December 3, Election Day—the date on which the Electoral College would meet to vote—was only 71 days away.

Sorodna vsebina

Jefferson was one of four presidential candidates. As he composed his letter to Rush, Jefferson paused from time to time to gather his thoughts, all the while gazing absently through an adjacent window at the shimmering heat and the foliage, now a lusterless pale green after a long, dry summer. Though he hated leaving his hilltop plantation and believed, as he told Rush, that gaining the presidency would make him “a constant butt for every shaft of calumny which malice & falsehood could form,” he nevertheless sought the office “with sincere zeal.”

He had been troubled by much that had occurred in incumbent John Adams’ presidency and was convinced that radicals within Adams’ Federalist Party were waging war against what he called the “spirit of 1776”—goals the American people had hoped to attain through the Revolution. He had earlier characterized Federalist rule as a “reign of witches,” insisting that the party was “adverse to liberty” and “calculated to undermine and demolish the republic.” If the Federalists prevailed, he believed, they would destroy the states and create a national government every bit as oppressive as that which Great Britain had tried to impose on the colonists before 1776.

The “revolution. of 1776,” Jefferson would later say, had determined the “form” of America’s government he believed the election of 1800 would decide its “principles.” “I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of Man,” he wrote.

Jefferson was not alone in believing that the election of 1800 was crucial. On the other side, Federalist Alexander Hamilton, who had been George Washington’s secretary of treasury, believed that it was a contest to save the new nation from “the fangs of Jefferson.” Hamilton agreed with a Federalist newspaper essay that argued defeat meant “happiness, constitution and laws [faced] endless and irretrievable ruin.” Federalists and Republicans appeared to agree on one thing only: that the victor in 1800 would set America’s course for generations to come, perhaps forever.

Only a quarter of a century after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the first election of the new 19th century was carried out in an era of intensely emotional partisanship among a people deeply divided over the scope of the government’s authority. But it was the French Revolution that had imposed a truly hyperbolic quality upon the partisan strife.

That revolution, which had begun in 1789 and did not run its course until 1815, deeply divided Americans. Conservatives, horrified by its violence and social leveling, applauded Great Britain’s efforts to stop it. The most conservative Americans, largely Federalists, appeared bent on an alliance with London that would restore the ties between America and Britain that had been severed in 1776. Jeffersonian Republicans, on the other hand, insisted that these radical conservatives wanted to turn back the clock to reinstitute much of the British colonial template. (Today’s Republican Party traces its origins not to Jefferson and his allies but to the party formed in 1854-1855, which carried Lincoln to the presidency in 1860.)

A few weeks before Adams’ inauguration in 1796, France, engaged in an all-consuming struggle with England for world domination, had decreed that it would not permit America to trade with Great Britain. The French Navy soon swept American ships from the seas, idling port-city workers and plunging the economy toward depression. When Adams sought to negotiate a settlement, Paris spurned his envoys.

Adams, in fact, hoped to avoid war, but found himself riding a whirlwind. The most extreme Federalists, known as Ultras, capitalized on the passions unleashed in this crisis and scored great victories in the off-year elections of 1798, taking charge of both the party and Congress. They created a provisional army and pressured Adams into putting Hamilton in charge. They passed heavy taxes to pay for the army and, with Federalist sympathizers in the press braying that “traitors must be silent,” enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts, which provided jail terms and exorbitant fines for anyone who uttered or published “any false, scandalous, and malicious” statement against the United States government or its officials. While Federalists defended the Sedition Act as a necessity in the midst of a grave national crisis, Jefferson and his followers saw it as a means of silencing Republicans—and a violation of the Bill of Rights. The Sedition Act, Jefferson contended, proved there was no step, “however atrocious,” the Ultras would not take.

All along, Jefferson had felt that Federalist extremists might overreach. By early 1799, Adams himself had arrived at the same conclusion. He, too, came to suspect that Hamilton and the Ultras wanted to precipitate a crisis with France. Their motivation perhaps had been to get Adams to secure an alliance with Great Britain and accept the Ultras’ program in Congress. But avowing that there “is no more prospect of seeing a French Army here, than there is in Heaven,” Adams refused to go along with the scheme and sent peace envoys to Paris. (Indeed, a treaty would be signed at the end of September 1800.)

It was in this bitterly partisan atmosphere that the election of 1800 was conducted. In those days, the Constitution stipulated that each of the 138 members of the Electoral College cast two votes for president, which allowed electors to cast one vote for a favorite son and a second for a candidate who actually stood a chance of winning. The Constitution also stipulated that if the candidates tied, or none received a majority of electoral votes, the House of Representatives “shall chuse by Ballot one of them for President.” Unlike today, each party nominated two candidates for the presidency.

Federalist congressmen had caucused that spring and, without indicating a preference, designated Adams and South Carolina’s Charles Cotesworth Pinckney as the party’s choices. Adams desperately wanted to be re-elected. He was eager to see the French crisis through to a satisfactory resolution and, at age 65, believed that a defeat would mean he would be sent home to Quincy, Massachusetts, to die in obscurity. Pinckney, born into Southern aristocracy and raised in England, had been the last of the four nominees to come around in favor of American independence. Once committed, however, he served valiantly, seeing action at Brandywine, Germantown and Charleston. Following the war, he sat in the Constitutional Convention both Washington and Adams had sent him to France on diplomatic missions.

In addition to Jefferson, Republicans chose Aaron Burr as their candidate, but designated Jefferson as the party’s first choice. Jefferson had held public office intermittently since 1767, serving Virginia in its legislature and as a wartime governor, sitting in Congress, crossing to Paris in 1784 for a five-year stint that included a posting as the American minister to France, and acting as secretary of state under Washington. His second place finish in the election of 1796 had made him vice president, as was the custom until 1804. Burr, at age 44 the youngest of the candidates, had abandoned his legal studies in 1775 to enlist in the Continental Army he had experienced the horrors of America’s failed invasion of Canada and the miseries of Valley Forge. After the war he practiced law and represented New York in the U.S. Senate. In 1800, he was serving as a member of the New York legislature.

In those days, the Constitution left the manner of selecting presidential electors to the states. In 11 of the 16 states, state legislatures picked the electors therefore, the party that controlled the state assembly garnered all that state’s electoral votes. In the other five states, electors were chosen by “qualified” voters (white, male property owners in some states, white male taxpayers in others). Some states used a winner-take-all system: voters cast their ballots for the entire slate of Federalist electors or for the Republican slate. Other states split electors among districts.

Presidential candidates did not kiss babies, ride in parades or shake hands. Nor did they even make stump speeches. The candidates tried to remain above the fray, leaving campaigning to surrogates, particularly elected officials from within their parties. Adams and Jefferson each returned home when Congress adjourned in May, and neither left their home states until they returned to the new capital of Washington in November.

But for all its differences, much about the campaign of 1800 was recognizably modern. Politicians carefully weighed which procedures were most likely to advance their party’s interests. Virginia, for instance, had permitted electors to be elected from districts in three previous presidential contests, but after Federalists carried 8 of 19 congressional districts in the elections of 1798, Republicans, who controlled the state assembly, switched to the winner-take-all format, virtually guaranteeing they would get every one of Virginia’s 21 electoral votes in 1800. The ploy was perfectly legal, and Federalists in Massachusetts, fearing an upsurge in Republican strength, scuttled district elections—which the state had used previously—to select electors by the legislature, which they controlled.

Though the contest was played out largely in the print media, the unsparing personal attacks on the character and temperament of the nominees resembled the studied incivility to which today’s candidates are accustomed on television. Adams was portrayed as a monarchist who had turned his back on republicanism he was called senile, a poor judge of character, vain, jealous and driven by an “ungovernable temper.” Pinckney was labeled a mediocrity, a man of “limited talents” who was “illy suited to the exalted station” of the presidency. Jefferson was accused of cowardice. Not only, said his critics, had he lived in luxury at Monticello while others sacrificed during the War of Independence, but he had fled like a jack rabbit when British soldiers raided Charlottesville in 1781. And he had failed egregiously as Virginia’s governor, demonstrating that his “nerves are too weak to bear anxiety and difficulties.” Federalists further insisted Jefferson had been transformed into a dangerous radical during his residence in France and was a “howling atheist.” For his part, Burr was depicted as without principles, a man who would do anything to get his hands on power.

Also like today, the election of 1800 seemed to last forever. “Electioneering is already begun,” the first lady, Abigail Adams, noted 13 months before the Electoral College was to meet. What made it such a protracted affair was that state legislatures were elected throughout the year as these assemblies more often than not chose presidential electors, the state contests to determine them became part of the national campaign. In 1800 the greatest surprise among these contests occurred in New York, a large, crucial state that had given all 12 of its electoral votes to Adams in 1796, allowing him to eke out a three-vote victory over Jefferson.

The battle for supremacy in the New York legislature had hinged on the outcome in New York City. Thanks largely to lopsided wins in two working-class wards where many voters owned no property, the Republicans secured all 24 of New York’s electoral votes for Jefferson and Burr. For Abigail Adams, that was enough to seal Adams’ fate. John Dawson, a Republican congressman from Virginia, declared: “The Republic is safe. The [Federalist] party are in rage & despair.”

But Adams himself refused to give up hope. After all, New England, which accounted for nearly half the electoral votes needed for a majority, was solidly in his camp, and he felt certain he would win some votes elsewhere. Adams believed that if he could get South Carolina’s eight votes, he would be virtually certain to garner the same number of electoral votes that had put him over the top four years earlier. And, at first, both parties were thought to have a shot at carrying the state.

When South Carolina’s legislature was elected in mid-October, the final tally revealed that the assembly was about evenly divided between Federalists and Republicans—though unaffiliated representatives, all pro-Jefferson, would determine the outcome. Now Adams’ hopes were fading fast. Upon hearing the news that Jefferson was assured of South Carolina’s eight votes, Abigail Adams remarked to her son Thomas that the “consequence to us personally is that we retire from public life.” All that remained to be determined was whether the assembly would instruct the electors to cast their second vote for Burr or Pinckney.

The various presidential electors met in their respective state capitals to vote on December 3. By law, their ballots were not to be opened and counted until February 11, but the outcome could hardly be kept secret for ten weeks. Sure enough, just nine days after the vote, Washington, D.C.’s National Intelligencer newspaper broke the news that neither Adams nor Pinckney had received a single South Carolina vote and, in the voting at large, Jefferson and Burr had each received 73 electoral votes. Adams had gotten 65, Pinckney 64. The House of Representatives would have to make the final decision between the two Republicans.

Adams thus became the first presidential candidate to fall victim to the notorious clause in the Constitution that counted each slave as three-fifths of one individual in calculating population used to allocate both House seats and electoral votes. Had slaves, who had no vote, not been so counted, Adams would have edged Jefferson by a vote of 63 to 61. In addition, the Federalists fell victim to the public’s perception that the Republicans stood for democracy and egalitarianism, while the Federalists were seen as imperious and authoritarian.

In the House, each state would cast a single vote. If each of the 16 states voted—that is, if none abstained𔃑 states would elect the president. Republicans controlled eight delegations—New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky and Tennessee. The Federalists held six: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware and South Carolina. And two delegations—Maryland and Vermont—were deadlocked.

Though Jefferson and Burr had tied in the Electoral College, public opinion appeared to side with Jefferson. Not only had he been the choice of his party’s nominating caucus, but he had served longer at the national level than Burr, and in a more exalted capacity. But if neither man was selected by noon on March 4, when Adams’ term ended, the country would be without a chief executive until the newly elected Congress convened in December, nine months later. In the interim, the current, Federalist-dominated Congress would be in control.

Faced with such a prospect, Jefferson wrote to Burr in December. His missive was cryptic, but in it he appeared to suggest that if Burr accepted the vice presidency, he would be given greater responsibilities than previous vice presidents. Burr’s response to Jefferson was reassuring. He pledged to “disclaim all competition” and spoke of “your administration.”

Meanwhile, the Federalists caucused to discuss their options. Some favored tying up the proceedings in order to hold on to power for several more months. Some wanted to try to invalidate, on technical grounds, enough electoral votes to make Adams the winner. Some urged the party to throw its support to Burr, believing that, as a native of mercantile New York City, he would be more friendly than Jefferson to the Federalist economic program. Not a few insisted that the party should support Jefferson, as he was clearly the popular choice. Others, including Hamilton, who had long opposed Burr in the rough and tumble of New York City politics, thought Jefferson more trustworthy than Burr. Hamilton argued that Burr was “without Scruple,” an “unprincipled. voluptuary” who would plunder the country. But Hamilton also urged the party to stall, in the hope of inducing Jefferson to make a deal. Hamilton proposed that in return for the Federalist votes that would make him president, Jefferson should promise to preserve the Federalist fiscal system (a properly funded national debt and the Bank), American neutrality and a strong navy, and to agree to “keeping in office all our Foederal Friends” below the cabinet level. Even Adams joined the fray, telling Jefferson that the presidency would be his “in an instant” should he accept Hamilton’s terms. Jefferson declined, insisting that he “should never go into the office of President. with my hands tied by any conditions which should hinder me from pursuing the measures” he thought best.

In the end, the Federalists decided to back Burr. Hearing of their decision, Jefferson told Adams that any attempt “to defeat the Presidential election” would “produce resistance by force, and incalculable consequences.”

Burr, who had seemed to disavow a fight for the highest office, now let it be known that he would accept the presidency if elected by the House. In Philadelphia, he met with several Republican congressmen, allegedly telling them that he intended to fight for it.

Burr had to know that he was playing a dangerous game and risking political suicide by challenging Jefferson, his party’s reigning power. The safest course would have been to acquiesce to the vice presidency. He was yet a young man, and given Jefferson’s penchant for retiring to Monticello—he had done so in 1776, 1781 and 1793—there was a good chance that Burr would be his party’s standard-bearer as early as 1804. But Burr also knew there was no guarantee he would live to see future elections. His mother and father had died at ages 27 and 42, respectively.

Burr’s was not the only intrigue. Given the high stakes, every conceivable pressure was applied to change votes. Those in the deadlocked delegations were courted daily, but no one was lobbied more aggressively than James Bayard, Delaware’s lone congressman, who held in his hands the sole determination of how his state would vote. Thirty-two years old in 1800, Bayard had practiced law in Wilmington before winning election to the House as a Federalist four years earlier. Bayard despised Virginia’s Republican planters, including Jefferson, whom he saw as hypocrites who owned hundreds of slaves and lived “like feudal barons” as they played the role of “high priests of liberty.” He announced he was supporting Burr.

The city of Washington awoke to a crippling snowstorm Wednesday, February 11, the day the House was to begin voting. Nevertheless, only one of the 105 House members did not make it in to Congress, and his absence would not change his delegation’s tally. Voting began the moment the House was gaveled into session. When the roll call was complete, Jefferson had carried eight states, Burr six, and two deadlocked states had cast uncommitted ballots Jefferson still needed one more vote for a majority. A second vote was held, with a similar tally, then a third. When at 3 a.m. the exhausted congressmen finally called it a day, 19 roll calls had been taken, all with the same inconclusive result.

By Saturday evening, three days later, the House had cast 33 ballots. The deadlock seemed unbreakable.

For weeks, warnings had circulated of drastic consequences if Republicans were denied the presidency. Now that danger seemed palpable. A shaken President Adams was certain the two sides had come to the “precipice” of disaster and that “a civil war was expected.” There was talk that Virginia would secede if Jefferson were not elected. Some Republicans declared they would convene another constitutional convention to restructure the federal government so that it reflected the “democratical spirit of America.” It was rumored that a mob had stormed the arsenal in Philadelphia and was preparing to march on Washington to drive the defeated Federalists from power. Jefferson said he could not restrain those of his supporters who threatened “a dissolution” of the Union. He told Adams that many Republicans were prepared to use force to prevent the Federalists’ “legislative usurpation” of the executive branch.

In all likelihood, it was these threats that ultimately broke the deadlock. The shift occurred sometime after Saturday’s final ballot it was Delaware’s Bayard who blinked. That night, he sought out a Republican close to Jefferson, almost certainly John Nicholas, a member of Virginia’s House delegation. Were Delaware to abstain, Bayard pointed out, only 15 states would ballot. With eight states already in his column, Jefferson would have a majority and the elusive victory at last. But in return, Bayard asked, would Jefferson accept the terms that the Federalists had earlier proffered? Nicholas responded, according to Bayard’s later recollections, that these conditions were “very reasonable” and that he could vouch for Jefferson’s acceptance.

The Federalists caucused behind doors on Sunday afternoon, February 15. When Bayard’s decision to abstain was announced, it touched off a firestorm. Cries of “Traitor! Traitor!” rang down on him. Bayard himself later wrote that the “clamor was prodigious, the reproaches vehement,” and that many old colleagues were “furious” with him. Two matters in particular roiled his comrades. Some were angry that Bayard had broken ranks before it was known what kind of deal, if any, Burr might have been willing to cut. Others were upset that nothing had been heard from Jefferson himself. During a second Federalist caucus that afternoon, Bayard agreed to take no action until Burr’s answer was known. In addition, the caucus directed Bayard to seek absolute assurances that Jefferson would go along with the deal.

Early the next morning, Monday, February 16, according to Bayard’s later testimony, Jefferson made it known through a third party that the terms demanded by the Federalists “corresponded with his views and intentions, and that we might confide in him accordingly.” The bargain was struck, at least to Bayard’s satisfaction. Unless Burr offered even better terms, Jefferson would be the third president of the United States.

At some point that Monday afternoon, Burr’s letters arrived. What exactly he said or did not say in them—they likely were destroyed soon after they reached Washington and their contents remain a mystery—disappointed his Federalist proponents. Bayard, in a letter written that Monday, told a friend that “Burr has acted a miserable paultry part. The election was in his power.” But Burr, at least according to Bayard’s interpretation, and for reasons that remain unknown to history, had refused to reach an accommodation with the Federalists. That same Monday evening a dejected Theodore Sedgwick, Speaker of the House and a passionate Jefferson hater, notified friends at home: “the gigg is up.”

The following day, February 17, the House gathered at noon to cast its 36th, and, as it turned out, final, vote. Bayard was true to his word: Delaware abstained, ending seven days of contention and the long electoral battle.

Bayard ultimately offered many reasons for his change of heart. On one occasion he claimed that he and the five other Federalists who had held the power to determine the election in their hands—four from Maryland and one from Vermont—had agreed to “give our votes to Mr. Jefferson” if it became clear that Burr could not win. Bayard also later insisted that he had acted from what he called “imperious necessity” to prevent a civil war or disunion. Still later he claimed to have been swayed by the public’s preference for Jefferson.

Had Jefferson in fact cut a deal to secure the presidency? Ever afterward, he insisted that such allegations were “absolutely false.” The historical evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Not only did many political insiders assert that Jefferson had indeed agreed to a bargain, but Bayard, in a letter dated February 17, the very day of the climactic House vote—as well as five years later, while testifying under oath in a libel suit—insisted that Jefferson had most certainly agreed to accept the Federalists’ terms. In another letter written at the time, Bayard assured a Federalist officeholder, who feared losing his position in a Republican administration: “I have taken good care of you. You are safe.”

Even Jefferson’s actions as president lend credence to the allegations. Despite having fought against the Hamiltonian economic system for nearly a decade, he acquiesced to it once in office, leaving the Bank of the United States in place and tolerating continued borrowing by the federal government. Nor did he remove most Federalist officeholders.

The mystery is not why Jefferson would deny making such an accord, but why he changed his mind after vowing never to bend. He must have concluded that he had no choice if he wished to become president by peaceful means. To permit the balloting to continue was to hazard seeing the presidency slip from his hands. Jefferson not only must have doubted the constancy of some of his supporters, but he knew that a majority of the Federalists favored Burr and were making the New Yorker the same offer they were dangling before him.

Burr’s behavior is more enigmatic. He had decided to make a play for the presidency, only apparently to refuse the very terms that would have guaranteed it to him. The reasons for his action have been lost in a confounding tangle of furtive transactions and deliberately destroyed evidence. It may have been that the Federalists demanded more of him than they did of Jefferson. Or Burr may have found it unpalatable to strike a bargain with ancient enemies, including the man he would kill in a duel three years later. Burr may also have been unwilling to embrace Federalist principles that he had opposed throughout his political career.

The final mystery of the election of 1800 is whether Jefferson and his backers would have sanctioned violence had he been denied the presidency. Soon after taking office, Jefferson claimed that “there was no idea of [using] force.” His remark proves little, yet during the ongoing battle in the House, he alternately spoke of acceding to the Federalists’ misconduct in the hope that their behavior would ruin them, or of calling a second Constitutional Convention. He probably would have chosen one, or both, of these courses before risking bloodshed and the end of the Union.

In the days that followed the House battle, Jefferson wrote letters to several surviving signers of the Declaration of Independence to explain what he believed his election had meant. It guaranteed the triumph of the American Revolution, he said, ensuring the realization of the new “chapter in the history of man” that had been promised by Thomas Paine in 1776. In the years that followed, his thoughts often returned to the election’s significance. In 1819, at age 76, he would characterize it as the “revolution of 1800,” and he rejoiced to a friend in Virginia, Spencer Roane, that it had been effected peacefully “by the rational and peaceful instruments of reform, the suffrage of the people.”


The Cold War Home Front: McCarthyism

But other forces also contributed to McCarthyism. The right-wing had long been wary of liberal, progressive policies like child labor laws and women's suffrage, which they viewed as socialism or communism. This was especially true of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. As far as the right was concerned, "New Dealism,&rdquo was heavily influenced by communism, and by the end of WWII it had ruled American society for a dozen years. During the McCarthyism era, much of the danger they saw was about vaguely defined "communist influence" rather than direct accusations of being Soviet spies. In fact, throughout the entire history of post-war McCarthyism, not a single government official was convicted of spying. But that didn&rsquot really matter to many Republicans. During the Roosevelt Era they had been completely shut out of power. Not only did Democrats rule the White House, they had controlled both houses of congress since 1933. During the 1944 elections the Republican candidate Thomas Dewey had tried to link Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal with communism. Democrats fired back by associating Republicans with Fascism. By the 1946 midterm elections, however, fascism had largely been defeated in Europe, but communism loomed as an even larger threat. Republicans found a winning issue. Avtor: &ldquoRed-baiting" their Democratic opponents—labeling them as "soft on communism," they gained traction with voters.

To bolster his claim that Hiss was a communist, Chambers produced sixty-five pages of retyped State Department documents and four pages in Hiss's own handwriting of copied State Department cables which he claimed to have obtained from Hiss in the 1930s the typed papers having been retyped from originals on the Hiss family's Woodstock typewriter. Both Chambers and Hiss had previously denied committing espionage. By introducing these documents, Chambers admitted that he had lied to the committee. Chambers then produced five rolls of 35 mm film, two of which contained State Department documents. Chambers had hidden the film in a hollowed-out pumpkin on his Maryland farm, and they became known as the “pumpkin papers".

From Lee case no. 40:
The employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City. His application is very sketchy. There has been no investigation. (C-8) is a reference. Though he is 43 years of age, his file reflects no history prior to June 1941.

McCarthy's speech was a lie, but Republicans went along for political gain. Democrats tried to pin him down on his list, and McCarthy first agreed, and then refused to name names. He couldn't have named any names if he had wanted to. The Lee List used only case numbers. He did not get a copy of the key to the list, matching names with the case numbers, until several weeks later. Democrats had little choice but to agree to the creation of a committee to investigate McCarthy's charges. They also acceded to Republican demands that the Congress be given the authority to subpoena the loyalty records of all government employees against whom charges would be heard. Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon insisted that the hearings be conducted in public, but even so, the investigators were able to take preliminary evidence and testimony in executive session (in private). The final Senate resolution authorized "a full and complete study and investigation as to whether persons who are disloyal to the United States are, or have been employed by the Department of the State."

June 14, 1954: In a gesture against the "godless communism" of the Soviet Union, the phrase "under God" was incorporated into the Pledge of Allegiance by a Joint Resolution of Congress amending §7 of the Flag Code enacted in 1942.

August 24, 1954: The Communist Control Act was signed by President Eisenhower. It outlawed the Communist Party of the United States and criminalized membership in, or support for, the Party.


Bibliography

Davies, Sarah. (1997). Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Getty, J. Arch. (1991). "State and Society under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s." Slavic Review 50(1):18-35.

Petrone, Karen. (2000). Life Has Become More Joyous Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Unger, Aryeh L. (1981). Constitutional Developments in the U.S.S.R.: A Guide to the Soviet Constitutions. London: Methuen.

Wimberg, Ellen. (1992). "Socialism, Democratism, and Criticism: The Soviet Press and the National Discussion of the 1936 Draft Constitution." Soviet Studies 44(2):313-332.


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